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Segall: The Taxing Law of Taxpayer Standing

THE TAXING LAW OF TAXPAYER STANDING
Eric J. Segall*
Today's opinion is, in one significant respect, entirely consistent with our previous cases
addressing taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Clause challenges to government
expenditures. Unfortunately, the consistency lies in the creation of utterly meaningless
distinctions which separate the case at hand from the precedents that have come out
differently, but which cannot possibly be (in any sane world) the reason it comes out
differently. I
The law of taxpayer standing has long been incoherent. Last term, the Supreme Court
2
Foundation,
made matters even worse with its holding in Hein v. Freedom from Religion
which denied standing to federal taxpayers challenging President Bush's faith-based
initiative program. Professor Youngin is thoroughly confused but is teaching Federal
3
Courts in the Spring, which everyone knows is the hardest course in law school. In
preparation,he enlists the assistance of Professor Tenureitis to help figure out the law of
taxpayerstanding.

Professor Tenureitis (PT): I understand you're a little confused about taxpayer
standing and would like to learn more in light of the Court's recent decision denying
standing to the plaintiffs challenging President Bush's faith-based initiative program.
Professor Youngin (PY): Thanks, I am confused. I have read the cases, and
studied the literature, but the Hein decision seems to make no sense. It appears to
insulate almost all Executive action from Establishment Clause challenge. If the
President put a permanent cross or a menorah on the White House, I'm not sure anyone
would have standing to challenge it. At the same time, the decision seems to allow
taxpayers to challenge congressional action.
PT: That might be the right interpretation of Hein, but let me suggest that we start
at the beginning with standing requirements generally and then discuss taxpayer
standing. Do you know where the notion of standing comes from?
* Professor of Law, Georgia State College of Law. I would like to thank Barry Freidman, Neil Kinkopf,
and Louise Weinberg for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this dialogue.
1. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring).
2. 127 S.Ct. 2553.
3. See Eric Segall, Twenty Questions (Or the Hardest Course in Law School), 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 497
(2001) (arguing that Federal Courts is the most difficult law school class).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007

1

TULSA LA W REVIEW

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 43 [2007], Iss. 3, Art. 4

[Vol. 43:673

PY: I think so.
Standing derives from Article III's "case or controversy"
requirement and separation of powers concerns. Federal courts are not allowed to issue
advisory opinions so before there is federal jurisdiction there must be two adverse parties
arguing about an issue with real life consequences.
PT: That's correct. The hornbook law is that every plaintiff in federal court has to
suffer a personal injury caused by the defendant that can be redressed by a favorable
decision. The Court has said that those requirements are the "irreducible constitutional
minimum," in every federal case, and cannot be waived by the parties because they're
4
necessary to the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
PY: Ok, but aren't there other standing requirements as well, beyond those
imposed by Article III?
PT: Yes, the Court calls those prudential standing requirements. Generally
speaking, a plaintiff is not allowed to assert the rights of third parties, generalized
grievances are not permitted (though we're not quite sure whether that is a prudential or
constitutional bar, but we'll talk more about that later), and the plaintiff must be in the
5
zone of interests protected by the statute in a case involving rights created by Congress.
PY: Where exactly do those prudential requirements come from?
PT: No one is exactly sure, but our best guess is the Supreme Court's own
equitable sense of what cases it should hear.
PY: What's the difference between the source of the prudential requirements and
the source of the constitutional ones? Didn't the Court create both?
PT: The Court has said that the constitutional requirements flow directly from
Article III.
PY: But the text of Article III doesn't say anything about personal injury, and
didn't Professor Berger demonstrate in his famous Yale Law Journal article that the
6
requirement of personal injury has no basis in history or common law?
PT: Maybe, but the Court doesn't agree.
PY: Well, I'm not sure I understand the personal injury requirement anyway. I
have read other articles arguing that the idea of judges trying to identify an injury
analytically distinct from the claim on the merits is incoherent.

4. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
5. Elk Grove UnifiedSch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004).
6. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a ConstitutionalRequirement? 78 Yale L.J. 816

(1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4

2

THE TAXING LA W OF TAXPAYER STANDING

2008]

Segall: The Taxing Law of Taxpayer Standing

PT: Who said that?
PY: I think Professor Fletcher said it best. 7 Take a person who is concerned about
cutbacks in welfare benefits but doesn't receive those benefits. Because of his concern,
he loses sleep and spends money for therapy to help him with his problem. If he filed
suit, the Court would hold that he has suffered no injury for standing purposes. But
another person who suffers sleep deprivation, maybe from the barking of a neighbor's
dog, and spends additional money for ear plugs, would have standing. Their injuries are
exactly the same (loss of sleep) but one has standing and one does not.
PT: What's the point?
PY: I think the point is that there is no way a court can make a determination of
injury apart from a decision on the merits. Therefore, the personal injury requirement
does not somehow stem automatically from Article III as the Court suggests. All the
standing requirements, constitutional and prudential, come from the Court's own sense
of what cases the Court wants to hear.
PT: That may be right, but lower courts still have to follow the Supreme Court's
decisions, which do distinguish between prudential and constitutional requirements.
Let's move on. You're here to talk about the Court's taxpayer standing cases, right?
PY: Yes.
PT: Ok, we have to start with Frothingham v. Mellon.8 In that case, the plaintiff
challenged a federal law giving the states money to fight maternal and infant mortality.
Mrs. Frothingham argued that the law 9exceeded Congress' enumerated powers and took
her money without due process of law.
PY: She wasn't asking for her tax money back though.
PT: Right, when we talk about taxpayer standing, we don't mean a person claiming
that she wants a tax refund but rather someone who is upset about how the government is
spending money and seeking an injunction against that spending.
PY: But Mrs. Frothingham didn't win.
PT: No. The Court said that a taxpayer couldn't challenge a congressional
spending law on the grounds that it took her tax money without due process of law. Her
interest in the federal treasury was too remote, and if she could sue so could everyone

7. See William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,98 Yale L.J. 221 (1988).
8. Cmmw. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (consolidated action).
at 479-80.
9. Id.by
Published
TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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PY: Did the Court say whether this bar on taxpayer standing was a constitutional
rule or a prudential one? In other words, could Congress have authorized the suit?
PT: No, the Court never answered that question.
PY: Ok, well the next taxpayer standing case is about Justice Black right?
PT: Yes. In Ex ParteLivitt,1 1 the plaintiff challenged Justice Black's appointment
to the Supreme Court because while in the Senate he voted to increase the benefits of the
Justices.
PY: Well, isn't it true that Article I, Section 6 forbids any member of Congress
from being appointed to any civil 12office "the Emoluments whereof shall have been
[i]ncreased," while he was in office.
PT: You memorized that provision?
PY: I don't have tenure yet.
PT: I understand. The Court said that the plaintiff had no injury because he shared
a general interest in common with everyone else. Therefore he couldn't sue.
PY: But Justice Black's appointment might have violated the Constitution.
PT: What does that have to do with standing?
PY: If this plaintiff couldn't sue, who could?
PT: Probably no one. What's your point?
PY: Ok, well at least Livitt is consistent with Frothingham. What's next?
PT: We have to talk about the Doremus case.

13

PY: The decision about prayer in school?
PT: Yes. The Court held that taxpayers couldn't challenge a New Jersey law
which required that five verses from the Old Testament be read at the beginning of each

10. Id. at 487.
11. 302U.S. 633 (1937).
12. U.S. Const. art 1,§ 6, cl. 2.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
13. Doremus v. Bd of Educ. of the Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
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school day.
PY: Why not?
PT: Because there was no pocketbook injury to the plaintiffs. The Court
said that
14
to have standing plaintiffs have to be injured in some direct and personal way.
PY: Weren't the children injured by being exposed to the prayers?
PT: The child of record had already graduated.
PY: So the case was really moot. Didn't the Court eventually rule that prayer in
schools violates the Establishment Clause? Someone must have had standing.
PT: Yes, the Court ruled that way in both Engel v. Vitale,15 and School District v.
Schempp. 16 The Court didn't discuss standing in Vitale, but in a footnote in Schempp,
the Court said that the parents and students were "directly affected" by the prayers and
17
therefore could sue.
PY: Is that our new test, whether an Establishment Clause violation "directly
affects" the plaintiff?
18
PT: No, not really, let's talk about Flastv. Cohen.

PY: Ok.
PT: The plaintiffs sued the government for giving money to religious schools.
They sued as federal taxpayers.
PY: When you say the "government," do you mean the Executive or Congress? I
think that becomes important later.
PT: Well, Cohen was in the Executive Branch.
PY: And the plaintiffs were complaining that their tax dollars were being used
unconstitutionally, just like Mrs. Frothingham and the plaintiff in Lvitt. The Court
should have denied standing on the same grounds.
PT: The Court took a different approach. Saying that the key issue in determining

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 434.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Id. at 224 n. 9.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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standing is whether the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
case, the Court came up with a new two pronged test to determine whether taxpayers will
have standing.
PY: I like tests because they make understanding doctrine easier.
PT: Good, this one asks whether the plaintiff is challenging a law enacted by
Congress under its Article I, Section 8 taxing and spending powers, and whether the law
violates a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power. Plaintiffs
who meet that test will have the requisite personal stake in the case to be granted
standing. 19
PY: And the plaintiffs satisfied that test.
PT: Sure. The money going to the schools came from Congress' taxing and
spending power and the Court found that the Establishment Clause was a specific
limitation on that power.
PY: But what actual injury did the plaintiffs suffer?
PT: The knowledge that their tax dollars were being used illegally.
PY: But wasn't that the exact same injury suffered by Mrs. Frothingham? And
couldn't the plaintiff in Lvitt have also argued that he was upset that his tax dollars were
being used to pay Justice Black's illegal salary? In none of these cases were the
plaintiffs asking for their money back. The cases all seem the same to me, including
Flast.
PT: That's how Justice Harlan saw the problem in his dissent in Flast. He said that
the Court's two part test didn't remotely measure a plaintiffs personal stake in the case.
He argued that if a plaintiff is upset about a constitutional violation, it can't possibly
make a difference for standing purposes which provision of the Constitution she alleges
is being violated or what was the source of the congressional enactment that allegedly
violates the Constitution. 20 Therefore, poor Mrs. Frothingham, and the Flast plaintiffs
should have been treated the same way. But, he was in dissent.
PY: But the Court didn't overrule Frothingham?
PT: No, the Court said that Mrs. Frothingham met the first part of the test, but not
the second because the Due Process Clause is not a specific limitation on the taxing and
spending power, unlike the Establishment Clause.

19. Id. at 102-03.

20. Id. at 121-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
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PY: You mean Congress can pass a law to spend money in violation of the Due
Process Clause and taxpayers won't have standing to challenge that law, but if Congress
spends money in violation of the Establishment Clause, then there is standing.
PT: I'm afraid so.
PY: So the Establishment Clause is special?
PT: We'll talk about that when we get to the Valley Forgecase.
PY: Let me get this straight. Mrs. Frothingham was mad that the government was
violating the law by spending tax money illegally but she had no standing. The plaintiff
in Ex ParteL~vitt was mad that the government was spending money illegally, and he
didn't have standing either. The Flast plaintiffs were mad that the government was
spending tax dollars illegally but they had standing. None of the three asked for their
money back, and all just wanted an injunction. The difference has to be that the
Establishment Clause is different.
PT: Do you want to talk about Valley Forge?
PY: Not yet. I take it after Flastthe ban on taxpayer standing had to be prudential
not constitutional?
PT: The Court never directly answered that question. Justice Harlan, who
wouldn't have granted standing in this case, did discuss the issue. He said that Congress
could authorize what he called public actions, which would include taxpayer and citizen
suits. He said that the bar was a prudential one, and if Congress granted standing in such
21
a case the separation of powers issues implicated by public actions would dissipate.
PY: That at least makes sense. Let's move on, what's next?
PT: On the same day in 1974, the Court interpreted Flast narrowly and denied
taxpayer standing in the Richardson and Schlesinger cases. 22 In Schlesinger, the
plaintiffs were upset that members of Congress were serving as officers in the Armed
Forces Reserves which they claimed led to a conflict of interest regarding the Viet Nam
War.
PY: Doesn't the Constitution say that no person can hold an Office in the
Executive Branch while being a member of Congress?

21. Id. at 130-31.
22. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S.

166 (1974).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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PT: Yes, that would be Article I, Section 6.23
PY: Isn't the purpose of that Clause to stop potential conflicts of interests?
PT: Yes, but the Court said the plaintiffs didn't meet the Flast test because they
were not challenging a law passed under Article I, Section 8, but rather a24decision by the
Executive Branch to allow members of Congress to serve in the reserves.
PY: But the plaintiffs were mad that the Constitution was being violated just like
the Flastplaintiffs. What's the difference?
PT: They had no concrete injury.
PY: But neither did the plaintiffs in Flast.
PT: That's true.
PY: Why is concrete injury important?
PT: The Court said that requiring the plaintiff to suffer concrete injury insures that
and that difficult constitutional
case
will be presented in a specific factual context
the
25
Court.
the
by
unnecessarily
decided
be
issues won't
PY: But that doesn't make sense. Couldn't the ACLU bring a case on ideological
grounds and present it to the Court in as vigorous and helpful a way as a plaintiff who
has a large monetary stake in the case but is not represented by adequate counsel.
PT: The Court didn't see it that way.
PY: And didn't the Court in Schlesinger specifically find that the case was
presented well; that the issues were sharply focused, and that the parties were sufficiently
26
adverse?
PT: Yes, yes, and yes.
PY: Ok, so is there really a relationship between concrete injury and the ability to
decide a case in a specific factual context?
PT: Apparently the Court thinks so. Do you want to talk about Richardson?

23. Article I, Section 6 provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. Const. art. I, § 6.
24. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
25. Id. at 220-21.
26. See id. at 225.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
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PY: That's the case about the CIA right?
PT: Yes, they refused to make public how much money they spend every year.

PY: I can understand that. But doesn't Article I, Section 9 require that "a regular
Statement of and Account" of all government expenditures must be published "from time
to time." 27 There's no exception for the CIA or the military. Maybe there should be, but
there isn't. Shouldn't the text of the Constitution matter?
PT: Have you read the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases recently?
PY: Good point, but that's for another day.
PT: Right. The Court held that the plaintiff in Richardson didn't meet the Flast
test because he wasn't challenging government expenditures under Article I, Section 8,
but simply arguing that the CIA's budget had to be disclosed.28
PY: But wasn't he arguing that the Constitution prohibited the CIA from spending
money unless it made public its expenditures, and isn't that the same thing? In other
words, the CIA was spending money illegally because Congress allowed it to do so
secretly. That allegation sounds like it should meet the Flasttest.
PT: The Court didn't think so. Also, everyone suffered the same injury as the
29
plaintiff so it was a generalized grievance and thus could not give rise to standing.
PY: What the Court is really saying is that when everyone is injured, no one is
injured.
PT: That's right.
PY: Didn't the plaintiff also say he couldn't vote intelligently because he didn't
know how much money the government was spending?
That's more than just
complaining that the government is violating the law. The denial of the right to vote
often gives rise to standing-like in those cases where whites claim that districts have
been apportioned to help African-Americans. 30 How come his voting claim didn't give
him standing?
PT: Those two words again-generalized grievance.
PY: In other words, the Court didn't want to hear the case.

27.
28.
29.
30.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
See Richardson,418 U.S. at175.
Id.at176-77.
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1992).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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PT: Would you want to decide whether the Constitution requires the CIA to
publish its spending?
PY: Ok, ok, did the Court in either Schlesinger or Richardson say whether the
generalized grievance requirement was constitutional or prudential?
PT: Nope.
PY: Did the Court overturn Flast?
PT: Nope.
PY: All right, what's next?
31

PT: Valley Forge.

PY: That's the case where the government gave a hospital to a religious university,
right?
PT: Yes, the old Department of Housing, Education and Welfare gave a piece of
property worth over half a million dollars to the Valley Forge Christian College, a school
that trained ministers.
PY: Who sued?
PT: Americans United for Separation of Church and State, as federal taxpayers,
arguing that the transfer violated the Establishment Clause.
PY: Then Flast should have controlled the case, and the plaintiffs had standing.
PT: Flast didn't control for two reasons. The Court said that
meet the first part of the Flast test because the decision to give the
made by the Executive Branch, not by Congress, and second, even
made by Congress, it was pursuant to Article IV's property clause
spending power of Article I, Section 8.32

the plaintiffs didn't
property away was
if the decision was
not the taxing and

PY: Let me see if I have this correct. The plaintiffs in Flast challenged the federal
government's decision to give money to religious schools, and they had standing. The
plaintiffs in Valley Forge challenged the federal government's decision to give property
to a religious school, and they didn't have standing.

31.

Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. Unitedfor Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464

(1982).
32. Id. at 479-80.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
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PT: That's correct.
PY: The Court didn't say there was a difference between land and money did it?
PT: No.
PY: And, doesn't the Establishment Clause apply to the entire federal government?
PT: Yes.
PY: So what difference does it make whether it is the Congress or the President
who violates the Clause for purposes of standing and why would it matter whether the
source of governmental authority is Article I or Article IV? How could either of those
things affect the plaintiffs personal stake in the case, which is what Flast said was so
important.
PT: Many trees have been laid to waste by scholars trying to answer those
questions.
PY: Any good answers.
PT: Nope, just a lot of dead wood.
PY: Did the Court overrule Flast?
PT: Not explicitly.
PY: Ok, so it was on the road to doing so?
PT: Not really, as you'll see when we discuss the Bowen case.
PY: Wait, what did the Court of Appeals hold in Valley Forge? Based on Flast, it
must have found standing.
PT: It did, but it wasn't crazy about the two-pronged Flast test so it also said that
the Establishment Clause was special for standing purposes and gave everyone an
individual right to sue.
PY: That sounds like the best interpretation of Flast.
PT: Except the Valley Forge Court specifically said that the Establishment Clause
is not special for standing purposes, that the Court would not create a hierarchy of
constitutional values, and that the fact that no one would have standing to challenge this
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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33
gift was not a reason to find standing.

PY: If the Establishment Clause is not special, and there was no standing in
Frothingham, Lkvitt, Schlesinger, Richardson, and Valley Forge, then Flast can't be
good law anymore. It just can't be.
PT: Well, just wait until Hein.
PY: Ok, I assume the Court said that the generalized grievance requirement was
constitutionally based.
PT: Not explicitly, no.
PY: Well is it?
PT: We'll talk about that after we discuss the Lujan case. But first we have to talk
about Bowen v. Kendrick,34 which implicates Valley Forge and Flast.
PY: Bowen was also an Establishment Clause case, right?
PT: Yes. Congress decided it would be a good idea to spend money to fight
teenage pregnancy so it authorized the Executive Branch to give money to charitable
groups, including religious organizations, for that worthy cause.
PY: Let me guess, some of the money went to Catholic organizations who
counseled against abortion.
PT: Yes.
PY: Who sued?
PT: Various groups claiming they had standing as federal taxpayers because they
satisfied the Flast test.
PY: I'm guessing the government claimed that Valley Forge had implicitly
overruled Flast.
PT: Yes. And in the alternative, it argued that Flast was not satisfied because the
money was being spent by the Executive not by Congress.
PY: Those arguments make sense given Valley Forge.

33. Id. at 484-85,489.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
34. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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PT: They do but the Court went in another direction and said that even though the
challenge was to executive discretion, as opposed to the law itself, because the money
35
flowed from Congress to the Executive, the plaintiffs satisfied the Flast test.
PY: But didn't the Congress also authorize the disposal of property in Valley
Forge, and the unsuccessful challenge there was also to executive discretion.
PT: Yes.
PY: And Valley Forge wasn't overturned?
PT: No.
PY: But it can't be reconciled with Bowen.
PT: Probably not.
PY: So basically Bowen v. Kendrick implicitly overturned Valley Forge which we
thought had implicitly overruled Flast?
PT: You got it. Except that Valley Forge is going to be reaffirmed in Hein.
PY: But so is Flast!
PT: True.
PY: And you expect me to teach these cases to law students?
PT: Why do you think I gave up federal courts so you could teach it?
PY: All right, so after Bowen, the Flast test is still alive and kicking, we don't
really understand Valley Forge, and we still don't know whether this whole scheme is
constitutionally required or prudentially based.
3
PT: That's about to change with the Lujan case.

6

PY: Which involved endangered animals, right?
PT: Yes, but if we go on, you have to promise me you absolutely will not write a
law review article that tries to be cute by talking about whether animals have standing.

35. Id. at 619-20.
36. Lujan
Defenders
of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555
(1992).
Published
byv.TU
Law Digital
Commons,
2007
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37
There are, believe it or not, at least nine of them already out there.

PY: Really, can animals have standing?
[Silence]
PY: Ok, I promise no cute articles about animals.
PT: Lujan involved a law requiring all agencies of the United States Government
to consult with the Secretary of Interior if one of their projects threatened endangered
animals.
PY: Sounds sensible, what was the problem?
PT: The President interpreted the law to only apply to agency action in the United
States and not overseas, and various environmental groups thought that interpretation
violated Congress's intent.
PY: How were they injured?
PT: There were several different theories. Two members of the environmental
group said they had plans to visit foreign counties where U.S. funded projects were
endangering animals. The Court said they didn't have standing because their plans
38
We can discuss environmental standing if you like, but it
weren't "imminent" enough.
isn't part of the problem of taxpayer standing and it will get us off track.
PY: No, thank you. I'm getting a headache.
PT: Ok, the other standing theory was based on a citizen suit provision in the law
United States for any violation of the law,
that gave any person a right to sue the
39
including the consultation requirements.
PY: That's a true congressional authorization of a citizen suit. Justice Harlan
would have said that was perfectly constitutional based on his dissent in Flast, right?
PT: Yes, he said Article III doesn't bar pubic actions, but the Court shouldn't hear
them without congressional authorization, which does make sense. If the people's
representatives in Congress authorize a public action against the government, then why

37. See e.g. Lauren Magnotti, Pawing Open the Courthouse Door: Why Animals' Interests Should Matter
When Courts Grant Standing, 80 St. John's L. Rev. 455 (2006); Cass Sunstein, A Tribute to Kenneth Karst:
Standing for Animals (With Notes On Animal Cases), 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1333 (2000).
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563-64.
39. Id. at 572 (The Endangered Species Act provided that "any person may commence a civil suit on his
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
14
own behalf' to enjoin a violation of the law.).
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should the Court say no?
PY: So, the Court should have upheld the provision and finally said that the bar on
generalized grievances was prudential.
PT: Maybe, but the Court actually said the ban on generalized grievances was
based on Article III. Therefore, Congress cannot change it and the law was
unconstitutional.4 0
PY: Scalia wrote the opinion, right?
PT: Yes.
PY: Did he rely on history?
PT: Not a word.
PY: Text?
PT: Nope.
PY: Case law?
PT: Not really, this issue had never been presented squarely to the Court before.
PY: Then what?
PT: He said that the concrete injury requirement talked about in Frothingham,
Richardson, etc., came directly from Article III because standing is all about separation
of powers, and it was that requirement that distinguished the work of the Judicial Branch
from that of the other two branches.
PY: But none of those cases involved a right created by Congress?
PT: He said that was irrelevant. He also said that if the Court were to allow
Congress to authorize suits by citizens who didn't suffer concrete injury, there would
be
41
an unconstitutional shift in power from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch.
PY: But since Congress created the right, can't it define the right any way it wants,
including requiring the Executive to follow certain procedures?

40. Id. at 573-74.
41. Id.at 577.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2007
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PT: Yes, and that was the point of Justice Kennedy's concurrence. He said that the
problem with the Endangered Species Act was simply that
as a matter of drafting,
42
Congress didn't clearly define the right and its related injury.
PY: I'm a little at a loss here. There were two adverse parties fighting over the
Executive's interpretation of the law and the resolution would affect how the Executive
Branch conducted its business-and Congress authorized the suit. What was missing?
PT: Concrete injury, apparently.
PY: Ok, so at least we now know, once and for all, that the ban on generalized
grievances, and the concrete injury requirement are constitutionally based and Congress
cannot change those requirements.
PT: Maybe.
PY: Excuse me.
43
PT: We have to talk about the Akins case.

PY: Wait, in Lujan did Scalia talk about Flast or Bowen? If the concrete injury
requirement is constitutional, how could those cases still be good law?
PT: He didn't discuss them at all.
PY: For good reason. Ok, remind me about Akins.
PT: A group of voters sued the Federal Election Commission because it didn't
require a pro-Israeli lobbying group to publish its membership and expenditures pursuant
to federal law. The plaintiffs claimed that they couldn't vote intelligently without that
information.
PY: Sounds like Richardson. Didn't the plaintiff in that case argue that he
couldn't vote intelligently unless the CIA disclosed its expenditures?
PT: Yes, except Richardson involved a constitutional claim. Here Congress said
that anyone aggrieved by a violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act could sue in
federal court to require the FEC to require registration and disclosure under the Act.
PY: But didn't Lujan hold that Congress doesn't have the power to convert a
generalized grievance into a valid claim for purposes of Article III standing?
42. Id. at 580 (Kennedy & Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2000)).
43. Fed. Election Commn. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
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PT: Yes.
PY: So the Court should have denied standing in Akins.
PT: Yes, but as you know the Court actually granted standing.
PY: I'm glad I'm sitting down.
PT: The Court distinguished between "abstract" generalized grievances which
don't give rise to standing, and "concrete" generalized grievances which can support
44
standing.
PY: You're kidding right?
PT: Nope.
PY: Ok, I hate to ask but what's the exact difference between an "abstract"
generalized grievance and a "concrete" generalized grievance?
PT: The Court wasn't exactly clear but it appears that an abstract generalized
grievance is where the plaintiff simply says that the government is violating the law and I
generalized grievance is one where many people suffer the
am angry; whereas a concrete
45
same or similar injuries.
PY: That might actually make sense. What was the injury in this case?
PT: The Court said it was the lack of information directly related to voting.
PY: So the Court overturned Richardson,which involved exactly the same injury.
PT: No, the Court said that Richardson only involved taxpayer standing, not the
kind of informational injury at issue in Akins.
PY: That's simply not true.
PT: So said Justice Scalia in dissent. This won't surprise you, but he was very
upset.
PY: I can understand that. Is it possible the Court was saying that the difference
between Akins and Richardson was that Congress created the cause of action in one but
not the other.

44. Id. at 23-24.
45. See id.
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PT: That's possible. The Court did say that the generalized grievance requirement
had been styled by previous Courts as both prudential and constitutional.4 6
PY: In other words, we still don't know whether that requirement is based on
Article III, or the Court's own sense of what cases it should hear.
PT: That is correct.
PY: And the Court didn't answer that question in Hein either, did it?
47
PT: No, afraid not. Do you want to talk about Hein?

PY: I think it's time.
PT: Well as you know, federal taxpayers challenged Executive Orders issued by
President Bush creating centers within federal agencies to make sure that faith-based
community groups would be eligible to compete for federal financial support as long as
those groups didn't use the money to support inherently religious activities like worship,
48
religious instruction, or prayer.
PY: And no congressional act supported the President's orders?
PT: Not a one. The President funded the agency's actions out of general funds and
there was no congressional involvement at all. He also directed that religious groups
couldn't be discriminated against in federal funding opportunities simply because they
49
were religious.
PY: And the plaintiffs relied on Flast and Bowen.
PT: Yes.
PY: I've read the case, and I'm a little confused by the number of different
opinions.
PT: Yes. Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Roberts denied standing but reaffirmed
Flast. Scalia and Thomas would have overruled Flast and denied all taxpayer standing,
and Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens would have said that taxpayers always have
standing to bring Establishment Clause challenges to federal governmental actions.
PY: How could the plurality opinion deny standing in this case and not overturn

46. Id. at 23.
47. Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553.
48. Id. at 2560-61.
49. Id. at 2560.
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol43/iss3/4
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Flast?
PT: It said that Flast was an extremely narrow exception to the bar on taxpayer
to a
standing, and the plaintiffs didn't meet the Flast test because there was no challenge
50
law passed under Article I, Section 8, or in fact to any congressional action.
PY: But didn't Justice Scalia point out in no uncertain terms what we and everyone
on the planet knows-that the Flasttest is incoherent. He made his point by arguing that
the Court usually requires some kind of "Wallet Injury" for standing, but that Flast made
an exception for "Psychic Injury," when taxpayers bring Establishment Clause
challenges to congressional action under Article 1, Section 8.51 The problem, according
to Scalia, is how to explain why a plaintiff who meets the Flast test has more "Psychic
Injury" than any other taxpayer plaintiff, like poor Mrs. Frothingham, who claims the
government is spending money in violation of the Constitution? 52 How could the Hein
plurality ignore that problem?
PT: It relied on Valley Forge for the distinction between challenges to
congressional action and challenges to executive action. In fact, the Hein plurality said
this case was even further from Flast than Valley Forge because at least in Valley Forge
to Article IV's
the decision to transfer property was delegated by Congress pursuant
53
property clause. In Hein, there was no congressional delegation at all.
PY: That's not true. All of the Executive's money comes from Congress.
Remember Article I, Section 9, "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.'54 In any event, what is the relationship
between personal injury and whether it is Congress or the Executive spending money
illegally?
PT: The plurality never answered that question. It just said Flast was a narrow
exception to the ban on taxpayer standing; that the plaintiffs didn't meet the elements of
that exception; and that the Court would neither extend nor overrule Flast.
PY: Let me see if I have this right. Under Flast and Bowen, plaintiffs are allowed
to bring Establishment Clause challenges to congressional laws enacted under Article I,
Section 8, but under Valley Forge and now Hein, plaintiffs cannot bring Establishment
Clause challenges to Executive action unless the action was taken with specific
congressional authorization of allocated funds.
PT: That seems about right.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
at 2564-66.
Id. at 2574 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at2574.
at 2566.
Id.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
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PY: What if the President decided to fund weekly Christian prayers out of general
funds or passed an executive order calling the United States a Judeo-Christian country?
PT: The plurality addressed those kinds of hypotheticals.
PY: Good, what did it say?
PT: First, none of those things has ever happened; second, Congress could always
"step in" and prohibit the practice; and third, such "improbable abuses," could be
challenged by other plaintiffs who would have standing because they were personally
55
injured.
PY: But none of that explains the faulty logic of the plurality opinion. As Scalia
said, if Congress gave the President money to distribute to worthy hospitals but the
President decided to give all the money to Catholic hospitals, plaintiffs would fail the
plurality's test because there would be no link "between congressional action and [the]
constitutional violation." 56 But those plaintiffs would have exactly the same injuries as
the plaintiffs in Flastand Bowen, who had standing.
PT: Exactly. In Bowen, the plaintiffs alleged that the Executive Branch had chosen
improper grant recipients and the Court unanimously found standing based on Flasteven
though Congress didn't mandate that allocation. In other words, the challenge was to the
use of executive discretion. Hein actually reduces Flast to less than it was before
because it undercuts Bowen.
PY: But Flast is still good law and means something.
PT: Yes, plaintiffs can challenge laws passed under Article I, Section 8 which
themselves allegedly violate the Establishment Clause. But if there is executive
discretion, Hein says no standing.
PY: Which basically means that the President can violate the Establishment Clause
and no one can sue, at least not under Flast.
PT: Right. Of course Justices Scalia and Thomas would reach that same result by
overturning Flast all together. Then both congressional and executive action would be
immunized unless the challenged law or practice actually cost the plaintiff money, or
threatened her life or liberty.
PY: So under Scalia's and Thomas's approach, the Congress and President
together could declare the United States a Christian country, and because "Psychic

55. Hein, 127S. Ct. at2571.
56. Id. at 2580 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
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Injury," isn't actionable, no one would have standing to challenge that declaration unless
Congress spent some money.
PT: That would be their view. It may or may not make sense from a standing
perspective, but it would be consistent with Scalia's position that the Establishment
57
Clause only prohibits coercive governmental action.
PY: But we have the Free Exercise Clause to protect us from governmental action
that coerces us based on our religious beliefs or practices. Scalia's view of the
Establishment Clause reduces it to simply what the Free Exercise Clause already
prohibits.
PT: Right, which is why Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens dissented
in Hein, and said that the Establishment Clause is different than other constitutional
provisions, that no one should be forced to contribute their tax dollars for religious
purposes, and that all taxpayers should have standing to challenge any governmental
expenditure. 5 8 You should notice by the way that as you suggested at the beginning, the
Justices's views on standing are somewhat determined by their view on the merits of
what the Establishment Clause prohibits.
PY: Thanks for the nod. Of course, as the Hein plurality pointed out, under the
dissent's approach, taxpayers would have standing to challenge virtually every thing the
government does and every speech the President or any of his officers make because the
Executive's actions are almost always supported in some way by our tax dollars.
PT: That's why this area of the law is so difficult. There are only three possible
answers to the question whether taxpayers should be allowed to sue the federal
government for spending their tax dollars unconstitutionally: Never, always, and
sometimes. The Court has chosen sometimes, which may not be all that bad.
PY: Yes it is because the "sometimes" it has chosen, the Flast test, makes
absolutely no sense at all.
PT: Do you have a better answer?
PY: Well... maybe.., but I am only a lowly associate professor.
PT: That's Ok, give it to me.
PY: Well, to start, the answer can't be that taxpayers have standing to sue the

57. See Lee v. Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., White & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting).
58. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584-88 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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Congress for violating the Establishment Clause but they don't have standing to sue the
President. The Establishment Clause applies to the whole government.
PT: Ok, go on.
PY: It also seems to me that Article III is satisfied by taxpayer actions, and the
plurality in Hein must agree with that idea, otherwise Flastcould not be affirmed.
PT: All right.
PY: But it also seems to me that allowing all taxpayer suits every time anyone
feels the government is spending money illegally raises separation of powers concerns
and potential floodgates of litigation problems.
PT: Sure.
PY: So we should allow taxpayer suits in only two circumstances: When they are
authorized by Congress, because we have already agreed it is a prudential bar, or when
absolutely necessary to the functioning of our democracy.
PT: And when would that be?
PY: When the government is allegedly violating the Constitution and it is unlikely
that anyone will be injured differently than anyone else. 59 For example, the 27th
Amendment prohibits Congress from giving itself a pay raise effective before the next
term, 6° but if Congress were to do so, no one would be injured more than anyone else.
There are many other structural constitutional provisions that would lose all coercive
force if they could not be enforced by the courts, but which will rarely if ever give rise to
unique injury.
PT: Like the Accounts Clause in Richardson, and the Incompatibility Clause in
Schlesinger.
PY: Right. As opposed to violations of structural provisions, governmental
violations of most of the Bill of Rights will cause specific injury to individuals. If the
government violates the First or Fourth Amendments, for example, someone will usually
lose liberty, speech, or money. But that's not true for structural provisions like the 27th

59. This argument was discussed and supported in more detail in Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the
Courts and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale for Public Actions, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 351 (1993).
Apparently, the argument did not make a great impression on the Supreme Court. In that article, the author
also pointed out that noted Federal Courts scholar Donald Doemberg had made a similar argument (albeit for
different reasons), again to no avail, in Donald Doemberg, We the People: John Locke, Collective
ConstitutionalRights, and Standing to ChallengeGovernment Action, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 52 (1985).
60. U.S. Const. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation of the services of the Senators and
Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.").
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Amendment, and that is why we need taxpayer suits to enforce those provisions.
PT: Ok, well assuming all of that, what about the Establishment Clause? Is that a
structural provision enforceable by taxpayers or a right that only someone personally
injured can enforce?
PY: That's a hard question because it seems like the Establishment Clause, located
in the First Amendment, protects individual rights, but in fact, the Free Exercise Clause
does all of that work for us. If a person is taxed, punished, or injured because of her
religious beliefs, the Free Exercise Clause provides protection. The framers must have
meant something different by the Establishment Clause and, whatever that is, it should
be different than the protection of individual rights already protected by the Free
Exercise Clause. What the Establishment Clause protects is a question on the merits, but
for standing purposes, it is hard to see how non-coercive governmental recognition of
religion will ever injure anyone personally other than in a "psychic" way, and that is why
we need taxpayer standing to enforce it.
PT: So how do you get around the Hein's plurality concern that anyone at any time
could bring an Establishment Clause challenge to any governmental action, including
every speech given by any public actor?
PY: That's a tough one, but I think Justice Souter answered this fully in dissent. If
the claim is frivolous, it will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, which is really no
different than denying it for lack of standing. If the claim has merit, then it probably
should be heard, and there is nothing in Article III to the contrary. 6 1 In other words, if
the claim can withstand a motion to dismiss, and there is reason to believe the
government is violating the Establishment Clause, whatever the Court eventually decides
that means, then the Court should hear the case.
PT: You seem to have it all figured out.
PY: I wouldn't say that (sheepish smile).
PT: Except that your answer to my question about the floodgates of Establishment
Clause challenges would apply equally to all taxpayer suits. If they are frivolous, the
Court can dismiss them under Section 10(b)(6), and if they have merit, the Court should
hear them. And then we are back to the problem of any taxpayer being able to sue
anytime he or she feels the government is spending money illegally.
PY: I understand your point. My answer is that this is exactly where the Court's
prudential view of standing should come in. We don't need taxpayers to enforce the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth amendments because there will

61. Hein,
Ct. atDigital
2586 n. Commons,
1 (Souter, Stevens,
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inevitably be people personally injured when the government violates those provisions.
Look at any Supreme Court docket. As a matter of sound judicial policy, and maybe
even respect for the other branches and the states, there is no compelling reason for the
Court to exercise judicial review in those cases at the behest of a taxpayer who simply
doesn't want the government spending her money illegally. But when it comes to
constitutional provisions that will be rendered unenforceable if we prohibit taxpayer
standing, fidelity to the Constitution, checks and balances, and separation of powers
counsels in favor of hearing those cases. The basis of my argument, of course, is that the
ban on taxpayer standing does not come from Article III. But there are seven Justices on
the Court who would affirm Flast, so they must believe that too. Being a prudential ban,
the bar on taxpayer standing should be lifted when failing to do so would render a
constitutional provision unenforceable.
PT: So the Courts would have to decide in every taxpayer standing case whether a
constitutional provision is a "structural" one or a provision that protects "individual"
rights.
PY: That's true, and there may be some close cases but that line is much sharper
than many others the Court draws in constitutional law. If you want to discuss the
"endorsement test," or "reasonable time, place an manner" restrictions, I'd be happy to
make my case. Plus, my approach is at least honest and coherent, unlike the Flast-Valley
Forge-Bowen-Hein travesty.
PT: How many years have you been on our faculty?
PY: Five.
PT: I look forward to your tenure vote later this year....
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